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LIMITED PARTNERSHIP-LIMITED CONTROL THROUGH A CORPORATE
GENERAL PARTNER-Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties,
Inc., 88 Wn. 2d 400, 562 P.2d 244 (1977).
Plaintiff entered into a contract to sell appliances to a limited part-
nership.1 The contract was signed on behalf of the limited partnership
by two officers of its corporate general partner. The officers each
owned fifty percent of the outstanding shares of the corporation. In
addition, they each held a limited partner's unit in the limited partner-
ship.- When the partnership failed to pay installments due, plaintiff
brought an action against the corporate general partner 3 and against
its two officers as individuals. The assertion of personal liability was
based on a provision of the limited partnership statute under which
limited partners may be regarded as general partners with general lia-
bility if it is shown that they have taken part in control of the partner-
ship.4 Held, when limited partners control the day-to-day business op-
1. The first limited partnership act in the United States was adopted by New York
in 1822. Nearly all states followed the New York example. See Lewis, The Uniform
Linited Partnership Act, 65 PA. L. REV. 715, 716 (1917). Narrow judicial construction
of the limited partnership statutes resulted in frequent imposition of personal liability
despite substantial compliance with the requirements of the statutes. To remedy this
problem the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act in 1916. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 114 (Supp.
1978) (Commissioners' Prefatory Note). See generally Lewis, supra at 720-23; Com-
ment, The Limited Partnership, 45 YALE L.J. 895, 899 (1936). The original uniform act
has been adopted by all states except Louisiana. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 94 (Supp.
1978). Washington adopted the Uniform Act in 1945 and revised it in 1972. WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 25.08.010-.3 10 (1976). A revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act was ap-
proved by the National Conference in 1976. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 114 (Supp.
1978) (Commissioners' Prefatory Note). See Sympositun: Limited Partnership Act, 9
ST. MARY'S L.J. 441-524 (1978).
Formation of a limited partnership under either the Washington statute or the Uni-
form Act requires a minimum of one limited and one general partner. General partners
have the attributes of partners in general partnerships: unlimited liability and freedom
to act in the name of the partnership. Limited partners have limited liability but acquire
the general liability of general partners if found to take part in control of the partner-
ship. See generally A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 26 (1968);
H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
§§ 28-36 (2d ed. 1970).
2. There were 52 such units outstanding. Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Proper-
ties, Inc., 14 Wn. App. 634, 636, 544 P.2d 781, 782 (1975), aff'd, 88 Wn. 2d 400, 562
P.2d 244 (1977).
3. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff against the corporate general partner.
id.
4. The statute provides as follows: "A limited partner shall not become liable as a
general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as limited




erations of a limited partnership through their positions as officers of
the corporate general partner, such control does not produce personal
liability for the debts of the partnership. Frigidaire Sales Corp. v.
Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wn. 2d 400, 562 P.2d 244 (1977).
Historically, the limited partner's privilege of limited liability has
been conditioned upon his abstention from active participation in the
conduct of the business.5 The increased use of corporations as general
partners has presented the question whether a limited partner's con-
trol through a position in the corporate general partner should elimi-
nate the privilege of limited liability. The Washington Supreme
Court, distinguishing a contrary decision in another jurisdiction, 6 de-
cided that a finding of such control does not warrant denial of the
privilege. The court would impose personal liability on a limited part-
ner acting as an officer of the corporate general partner only if some
equitable ground independent of actual control mandated such a re-
sult. The practical effect of the decision is that there will be relatively
few situations in which limited partners exercising control of a limited
partnership through control of its corporate general partner will be
held personally liable for the debts of the partnership. 7 In view of the
typical use of the modern limited partnership, 8 the outcome of Frigi-
daire Sales reinforces the protection of limited liability for individuals
motivated by the desire to reduce income tax liabilities and decreases
protection for persons extending credit to those individuals.
5. Statutes enacted prior to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act penalized limited
partner "interference" with the operation of the business with conversion to general
partner status. See Burdick, Limited Partnerships in America and England, 6 MICH. L.
REV. 525, 530-31 (1906); The Limited Partership, supra note 1, at 898-99.
6. In Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975). the Texas Su-
preme Court applied an identical statute to a similar factual pattern and reached a re-
sult opposite to that of Frigidaire Sales. The Washington Supreme Court distinguished
Delaney on two grounds: Texas had not yet decided whether corporations were accept-
able as general partners in limited partnerships, and the corporate general partner in
Delaney was set up contemporaneously with the limited partnership with operation of
the partnership as its sole purpose. The propriety of a corporate general partner in
Washington was confirmed by the legislature in 1972. See notes 18-20 and accompany-
ing text infra. In Frigidaire Sales the corporate general partner operated several limited
partnerships, therefore its officers managed the corporation with purposes other than the
sole benefit of the named limited partnership. 88 Wn. 2d at 403-04, 562 P.2d at 246.
Concerning the first ground, the Texas court explicitly stated that the question of the
propriety of a corporate general partner was unrelated to its decision. 526 S.W.2d at
546. With respect to the second factor, the number of limited partnerships controlled by
the corporate general partner appears to be irrelevant to a determination of limited
partner "control" for purposes of the limited partnership statute. See note 20 infra.
7. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text infra.
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I. THE COURT'S REASONING
Although the court refused to impose liability in this case, it sug-
gested that it would do so in a similar situation if additional consider-
ations were present. Personal liability could be established either
through the corporate law doctrine of disregard of corporate entity9
or under the court's narrow interpretation of the limited partnership
statute. The court identified various theories underlying the doctrine
of disregard which would justify the imposition of personal liability.
First, the court might disregard the corporate entity if it found the
corporation to be inadequately capitalized. 10 Second, the corporate
entity might be disregarded if individuals in control of the corporate
general partner failed to keep the business of the corporation separate
from their personal affairs." Generally, the perpetration of fraud or
manifest injustice on persons dealing with the corporation would jus-
tify imposing personal liability.12
The court next examined the operation of the limited partnership
statute. The statute treats limited partners as general partners with
general liability when it is shown that they have taken part in control
of the partnership.' 3 The court acknowledged that in the instant case
limited partners in fact controlled the day-to-day operations of the
limited partnership. 14 However, the court refused to find that they
were generally liable for two reasons. First, the limited partners had
acted as agents for their corporate principal and not in their individ-
ual capacities. "In the eyes of the law" it was the corporation and not
9. The universally cited general formulation of the doctrine is as follows:
If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a
corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until suffi-
cient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law
will regard the corporation as an association of persons.
United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1905). See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 41-46 (rev. vol. 1974); H. HENN, supra note 1, at § 146.
10. "If a corporate general partner is inadequately capitalized, the rights of the
creditor are adequately protected under the 'piercing-the-corporate-veil' doctrine of
corporation law." 88 Wn. 2d at 404, 562 P.2d at 247.
11. "When the shareholders of a corporation, who are also the corporation's officers
and directors, conscientiously keep the affairs of the corporation separate from their
personal affairs, and no fraud or manifest injustice is perpetrated on third persons who
deal with the corporation, the corporation's separate entity should be respected." Id. at
405, 562 P.2d at 247.
12. Id.
13. See note 4 supra.
14. 88 Wn. 2d at 401, 562 P.2d at 245.
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its agents which controlled the limited partnership. 15 Second, because
the limited partners had "scrupulously separated their actions on be-
half of the corporation from their personal actions," the creditor nev-
er assumed that they were general partners with general liability. 1
6
II. INTERPRETING THE CONTROL PROVISION
OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP STATUTE
A. The Recent Amendment to the Control Provision
In thus approving de facto control by limited partners, Frigidaire
Sales overthrows the longstanding policy of requiring forfeiture of
control as quid pro quo for limited liability in the limited partner-
ship.' 7 This result was achieved not only without legislative sanction
but in the face of a recent revision of the limited partnership statute
which evidenced a legislative policy of permitting only a very narrow
range of limited partner activity.' 8 The revised control restriction pro-
vides that a limited partner's right to vote upon matters affecting the
basic structure of the partnership, including transfer of a majority of
the voting stock of a corporate general partner, does not amount to
participation in control. 19 Nowhere did the legislature suggest that
limited partners may control a corporate general partner, either
15. Id. at 405. 562 P.2d at 247.
16. Id.
17. The Texas Supreme Court so strongly resisted this result that it suggested lim-
ited partner control through a corporate general partner would justify piercing the cor-
porate veil to impose personal liability because under such circumstances the corpora-
tion is used to circumvent the limited partnership statute. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease
Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. 1975).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.070 (1976).
19. The statute provides.
A limited partner shall not be deemed to take part in the control of the business
by virtue of his possessing or exercising a power, specified in the certificate, to vote
upon matters affecting the basic structure of the partnership. including the follow-
ing matters or others of a similar nature: (a) Election, removal, or substitution of
general partners, including, but not limited to. transfer of a majority of the voting
stock of a corporate general partner. (b) Termination of the partnership. (c)
Amendment of the partnership agreement. (d) Sale of all or substantially all of the
assets of the partnership.
WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.070(2) (1976).
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through ownership or management, 20 or that the restriction on limited
partner control was to be ineffective against limited partners who are
officers in the corporate general partner. If the legislature had in-
tended such a sweeping change in the effect of the statute, it could
have stated so expressly.
B. The Texas Interpretation Compared with the Rule
of Frigidaire Sales
Under the Frigidaire Sales approach, if a limited partner is an offi-
cer of the corporate general partner, the limited partner's participa-
tion in control of the partnership becomes irrelevant. The creditor
who fails to obtain a personal guarantee l is denied a personal recov-
ery unless he can demonstrate some equitable ground for recovery.
This approach is flatly opposed to the position taken by the Texas Su-
preme Court in Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd.,22 in which the court
stated that personal liability would be imposed on limited partners ex-
ercising control of the partnership in any capacity. In that case, the
limited partners' status as corporate officers23 and the question of
creditor reliance 24 were held irrelevant to the determination of statu-
tory liability.
20. Since "control" is not defined in the statute, the task of determining what
acts amount to control has been left to the courts. Cases confronting this problem are
summarized and discussed in BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 147; Feld, The "Control" Test
for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (1969); Comment, "Control" in the
Limited Partnership, 7 J. MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. AND PROC. 416 (1974). See also Cole-
man & Weatherbie, Special Problems in Limited Partnership Planning, 30 Sw. LJ. 887,
897-906 (1976).
21. The court emphasized that contract claimants have the ability to protect them-
selves prior to breach: "If petitioner had not wished to rely on the solvency of Union
Properties as the only general partner, it could have insisted that respondents personally
guarantee contractual performance." 88 Wn. 2d at 406, 562 P.2d at 247.
22. 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975). See note 6 infra.
23. The Delaney court justified its attitude toward officer status as follows:
Assuming that Interlease Corporation was a legal general partner .... this would
not prevent [the corporate officers] from taking part in the control of the business
in their individual capacities as well as their corporate capacities. In no event
should they be permitted to escape the statutory liability which would have de-
volved upon them if there had been no attempted interposition of the corporate
shield against personal liability.
526 S.W.2d at 546.
24. The court noted that the control restriction "simply provides that a limited part-
ner who takes part in the control of the business subjects himself to personal liability as
a general partner. The statute makes no mention of any requirement of reliance on the
part of the party attempting to hold the limited partner personally liable." Id. at 545.
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The choice between the two interpretations is the choice between a
formal and a nonformal rule.2 5 Under Delaney the imposition of lia-
bility may seem arbitrary because there is no investigation into under-
lying equities. At the same time, this feature imports the advantage of
ease of judicial administration and makes results more predictable for
both planners and litigants*26 On the other hand, the equitable
approach of Frigidaire Sales is superficially appealing because its
flexibility may enable courts to identify the offending party.2 7 How-
ever, a close examination of the courts' experience with the equitable
theories offered reveals that those theories operate to impose liability
only on the very careless. Wary limited partners should be able to
avoid the burden of personal liability even when they have established
and control a thinly capitalized enterprise.
C. The Difficulty of Establishing Personal Liability
under Frigidaire Sales
A creditor seeking to establish personal liability by piercing the cor-
porate veil is first met by the general rule that the corporate entity is
to be respected except in extraordinary circumstances. 28 The Frigi-
daire Sales opinion suggests that a finding of undercapitalization
qualifies as such an extraordinary circumstance. Although commenta-
tors have suggested that undercapitalization justifies disregard, 29 a
search of the reported decisions reveals no instance in which an Amer-
ican court has grounded disregard solely on a finding of inadequate
capitalization. There is no precedent in Washington, but courts in
other jurisdictions have treated inadequate capitalization as merely
25. See generally Powers, Formalism and Nonformnalisn in Choice of Law Meth-
odology, 52 WASH. L. REV. 27 (1976); Note. Jurisdiction-A Methodological Analysis:
Implications for Presence and Domicile as Jurisdictional Bases, 53 WASH. L. REV. 537
(1978).
26. Of course, the problem of determining what acts amount to control remains.
See note 20 supra.
27. It should be noted that the court implies that the same equitable approach would
be adopted in cases involving limited partnerships comprised solely of individual part-
ners. See note 34 infra.
28. See I W. FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 41; H. HENN, supra note 1, § 46.
29. See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 129 (1946); I W.
FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 44.1. A presumption that this doctrine provides real protec-
tion for creditors underlies approval of the Frigidaire Sales approach in Coleman and
Weatherbie, supra note 20, at 902.
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one factor to be considered in the decision to disregard.30 Judicial
statements that inadequate capitalization alone is insufficient to sup-
port disregard are numerous. 31 Furthermore, the instant case pro-
vided a prime opportunity for the court to apply an undercapitaliza-
tion test. The court's failure to remand or make any inquiry into the
capitalization of the corporate general partner scarcely portends
energetic application of the doctrine.
The opinion reiterates the well-established doctrine that the corpo-
rate entity may be disregarded where the affairs of the corporation
and the personal business of an individual controlling it become so
intermingled that failure to disregard would result in fraud or
injustice. 32 This doctrine has been employed to pierce the corporate
30. Inadequate capitalization has most often been considered in decisions to disre-
gard when the controlling individuals of the corporation have failed to maintain it as an
institution with a life independent of their own activities, thus warranting application of
the "alter ego doctrine" and the court's decision to disregard. See, e.g., Minton v. Cava-
ney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961); Shafford v. Otto Sales Co.,
149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957). The cases are discussed in Annot., 63
A.L.R.2d 1051 (1959). One commentator has suggested that inadequate capitalization is
the major factor in cases that involve both the alter ego doctrine and inadequate capital-
ization:
The cases consistently say that inadequate capitalization by itself is not a sufficient
ground upon which to find alter ego. Nonetheless, inadequate capitalization seems
to be the rationale most cited when the corporate veil is pierced. Admittedly, other
reasons are always found, but these reasons seem to evolve from the factor of inad-
equate capitalization.
Grossman, Alter Ego: A Perplexing Doctrine, 51 L.A.BJ. 233, 236 (1975). Inadequate
capitalization may be the rationale most cited because it is almost always present in
these cases. When a corporation possesses funds sufficient to pay its debts plaintiff has
little incentive to seek disregard of the corporate entity.
One should not confuse the courts' equitable power to disregard the corporate entity
in order to impose general personal liability with equitable power to characterize a
"debt" as a capital contribution when persons establishing a corporation make a nomi-
nal loan of assets or cash to the corporation while establishing a relatively small nomi-
nal capital contribution. Creditors stand a better chance of success in the latter case.
The result in such cases is that insider claims to corporate assets are subordinated to the
claims of outside creditors. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Arnold v.
Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941). Arnold is discussed in N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 15 (1971), as a case involving disregard of corporate entity.
3 1. See, e.g., Dewitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d
681, 687 (4th Cir. 1976); Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775,
783 (1972); North Arlington Med. Bldg., Inc. v. Sanchez Construction Co., 471 P.2d
240, 244 (Nev. 1970).
32. See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 41.1; Corrigan and Schirott,
Piercing the Corporate Veil: Dispelling the Mists of Metaphor, in TRIAL LAWYERS
GUIDE 121 (J. Kennelly ed. 1973); Grossman, supra note 30. Washington courts have
sometimes found opportunity to approve the doctrine in cases (such as Frigidaire Sales)
in which the corporate veil was not actually pierced. See Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v.
Daniels, 15 Wn. 2d 393, 396, 130 P.2d 892, 894 (1942); Von Herberg v. Von Herberg, 6
Wn. 2d 100, 114-15, 106 P.2d 737, 743-44 (1940); Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash. 152,
156-57, 74 P.2d 990, 992 (1938); Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 13 Wn. App.
489, 496, 535 P.2d 137, 142 (1975). Washington courts have also employed the doctrine
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veil only in cases of clear abuse of the corporate form and should cre-
ate no danger for the limited partner who controls a corporate general
partner whose independent identity is formally maintained. 33
The court's interpretation of the limited partnership statute sug-
gests that if a limited partner is acting as the agent of a corporate gen-
eral partner, the statute mandates only that the limited partner may be
held personally liable in cases in which he has led the creditor to
believe that he is a general partner with general liability. 34 Thus inter-
preted, the statute appears to add nothing to general principles of es-
toppel.
D. Undesirable Effects of the Frigidaire Sales Interpretation
It is undesirable that a person with both a limited partner's interest
and a controlling interest in the corporate general partner be allowed
limited liability because tax considerations will ordinarily persuade
to impose personal liability. Kueckelhan v. Fed. Old Line Ins. Co.. 69 Wn. 2d 392. 410-
12, 418 P.2d 443. 456 (1966); J.1. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark. 64 Wn. 2d 470. 478. 392
P.2d 215. 220 (1964), Superior Portland Cement. Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co.. 33
Wn. 2d 169. 212-16. 205 P.2d 597, 620-22 (1949); Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Securities
Co.. 9 Wn. 2d 45. 69-70. 113 P.2d 845, 856 (1941); National Bank of Commerce of
Seattle v. Dunn. 194 Wash. 472. 500, 78 P.2d 535, 547 (1938); Roberts v. Hilton Land
Co., 45 Wash. 464. 468, 88 P. 946, 947 (1907); Burns v. Norwesco Marine. Inc.. 13 Wn.
App. 414, 418-20, 535 P.2d 860. 862-64 (1975).
33. Factors a court may consider in determining whether a corporation has main-
tained an independent identity include a) segregation of the funds of the corporation
from those of the controlling person(s) or entity, b) diversion of corporate funds to non-
corporate uses, c) use by individuals controlling the corporation of corporate assets as
their own. d) maintenance of adequate corporate records. e) use of the same business lo-
cation and/or employees by more than one entity, and f) diversion of corporate assets to
another entity to the detriment of creditors. Grossman, supra note 30, at 234.
34. 88 Wn. 2d at 405. 562 P.2d at 247. The reliance interpretation of the control
provision, UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Ac-i § 7 (act withdrawn 1976). was first ad-
vanced in Feld. supra note 20. See also Coleman and Weatherbie, supra note 20. at 899.
The court cited the Feld article in support of its statement that the limited partners
should not be liable because the creditor did not rely on their acts in control to assume
they were general partners. 88 Wn. 2d at 405, 562 P.2d at 247. However, Feld's argu-
ment does not support an "'actual reliance" interpretation of the control provison:
" [01 nly activities which conceivably could induce reasonable reliance, such as supervi-
sion of the partnership's day-to-day activities, should produce general liability." Feld.
supra note 20, at 1479. Thus, even under the Feld reliance interpretation of the control
provision, personal liability would have been established in Frigidaire Sales.
The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act adopts a limited "actual knowledge-
standard: "Btt [if] the litnited partner's participation in the control of the business is
not substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general partner, he is liable
only to persons who transact business with the limited partnership with actual knowl-




her to put the bulk of her funds into limited partner units,35 leading
directly to undercapitalization of the corporate general partner.
Adoption of the Delaney approach would have the twin effects of dis-
couraging limited partners from participating in control and inducing
those who do so to exercise control prudently. Controlling partners
would know that their personal assets insured the debts of the enter-
prise and would therefore be more likely to manage cautiously. Fur-
thermore, they would consider their potential exposure to personal
liability prior to assuming the positions of limited partner and control-
ling investor or officer of the corporate general partner. Frigidaire
Sales' removal of the threat of personal liability enables a controlling
limited partner to become an excessive risk taker.
The limited partnership has become the most common vehicle for
the tax shelter investment.36 Tax shelters are inherently risky for vari-
ous reasons. Tax shelter investors are usually individuals of high in-
come motivated to enter a shelter by the desire to reduce tax liability
on income from other sources. They are likely to make riskier invest-
ments than others because their potential net loss (the loss of money
35. Since the corporation is an independent tax-paying entity, I.R.C. § 11, to the ex-
tent that an investor's funds are allocated to shares in a corporate general partner rather
than in directly held partnership units, partnership losses can not be passed through to
the investor to reduce tax liability on income from other sources. Furthermore, if the
partnership generates and distributes a profit, it will be taxable at the corporate level
before reaching the investor as shareholder in the corporate general partner. Income at-
tributable to direct ownership of a partner's interest is not subject to such double taxa-
tion. See note 36 infra.
Where one corporation serves as a general partner for more than one limited partner-
ship, another motive for allocation of funds to limited partner units rather than to the
corporate general partner appears: the corporate general partner's assets are subjected
to potential liability from the failure of any of the limited partnerships in which it parti-
cipates. A limited partner's investment is lost only if the home partnership fails.
36. According to a congressional report, "The form of entity most commonly
chosen to maximize tax benefits in a tax shelter investment has been the limited partner-
ship." STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 95TH CONG., tST SESS., 1 TAX REvi-
SION IssuEs-1976, at 7 (Comm. Print 1976) (description of H.R. 10612) [hereinafter
cited as STAFF REPORT ON TAX SHELTERS]. At least one commentator has stated that the
terms "limited partnership" and "tax shelter" have become synonymous. Stiss, Limited
Partnerships: the IRS Attack on Tax Shelters, 6 TAX ADVISER 659, 659 (1975). Limited
partnerships ideally serve the tax shelter investor because, in addition to the privilege of
limited liability and the absence of income taxation at the partnership level, I.R.C. §
701, limited partners are allowed to utilize their proportionate share of partnership
losses as tax deductions, thus reducing tax liability on income from other sources. I.R.C.
§ 702(a). Partnership "losses" for the purpose of determining tax deductions are inflated
through rapid depreciation of partnership assets.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified in scat-
tered sections of I.R.C.), struck at the heart of many limited partnership tax shelters with
its "at risk" limitation on the extent to which limited partners may increase their basis to
reflect partnership borrowing. An investor may not take tax deductions for partnership
783
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reduced by the tax deduction produced by such loss) is less.3 7 More
importantly, the tax shelter is risky because it is usually highly lever-
aged in order to maximize tax deductions per dollar invested.38
III. CONCLUSION
The court in Frigidaire Sales was faced with the problem of allocat-
ing the risk created by a limited partnership which was ultimately un-
ble to pay its debts. The drafters of the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act intended that limited partners taking part in control of a limited
partnership as well as nominal general partners should bear the risk of
losses in excess of her adjusted basis in the investment. Formerly. investors were al-
lowed to increase their basis to reflect partnership nonrecourse financing. In many
cases, investors have been provided with tax deductions in an amount greater than their
out-of-pocket investments, without personal liability for the loans which made this pos-
sible. Under the 1976 revision, an investor may not increase her basis to reflect partner-
ship borrowing for which she is not personally liable ("at risk"). I.R.C. §§ 465. 704(d).
Significantly, organizations whose principal activity is investing in real property are ex-
empt from this provision. I.R.C. § 704(d). On the general impact of the 1976
amendments, see generally SENATE FINANCE COMM. REP., TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976. S.
REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Dailey and Gaffney. Anatomy of a Real
Estate Tax Shelter: 7ie Tax Reform Scalpel, 55 TAXES 127 (1977).
Determination of corporate or partnership status for tax purposes is made under the
"Kintner regulations." Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3, regardless of the classification
under state law. The regulations are treated extensively in Note. Tax Classification of
Limited Partnerships: 77he IRS Bombards the Tax Shelters, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 408
(1977) thereinafter cited as Tax Classification]. See also STAFF REPORT Ot, TAX SHEL-
TERS, supra at 108-09; Comment, Tire Limited Partnership as a Vehicle for Syndicated
Real Estate Investment: Selected Tax Considerations, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1124, 1126-
37. The regulations were designed to prevent professional organizations from taking
advantage of corporate tax status and were therefore weighted in favor of finding part-
nership status. They have "had the unintended effect of virtually guaranteeing the de-
sired partnership tax status to the limited partnership tax shelters." Tax Classification,
supra at 417-18. The IRS has diligently attempted to overcome this bias in its regula-
tions. For example, in Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, No. 77-1056 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 1978), and Zuckman v. United States. 524
F.2d 729 (1975), IRS denials of partnership status were overruled. The IRS proposed
amendments to the regulations in January 1977, which would classify most tax shelters
as associations rather than partnerships. "The Treasury Department immediately with-
drew these proposals, apparently in response to a storm of protest from real estate inter-
ests and the Department of Housing and Urban Development." Tax classification, sa-
pra at 410 (footnote omitted).
37. See STAFF REPORT ON TAX SHELTERS, supra note 36, at 5.
38. According to one commentator, "In the typical real estate tax shelter the major-
ity of partners (i.e., the limited partners) make relatively small capital contributions; all
other necessary financing is obtained through the issuance of debt." Davies, The Admain-
istrative Assault Upon the Real Estate Tax Shelter, 54 TAXES 505. 508 (1976). On the
importance of leveraging in the creation of a tax shelter, see generally STAFF REPORT ON
TAX SHELTERS, supra note 36, at 5-6; Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The
Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX L. REV. 525 (1972); Stiss, supra note 36, at 663; Com-
ment, The Limnited Partnership as a Vehicle for Syndicated Real Estate Investment: Se-
lected Tax Considerations, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1124, 1143-46.
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the possibility of a partnership failure. 39 Protection of parties dealing
with the enterprise was guaranteed by the personal assets of persons in
control. This keystone to the structure of the limited partnership was
jolted when corporations began to take positions as general partners.
Greater protection would be accorded creditors by a statutory
requirement that a corporate general partner be capitalized at a level
sufficient to satisfy prospective partnership liabilities. At present no
such statutory requirement exists. If defining appropriate minimum
capitalization levels proves impossible, state legislatures should ban
corporations from the role of general partner in the limited partner-
ship. Whatever the social utility of the corporation in other contexts,
it is clear that the only function it served in Frigidaire Sales was to
shield persons in control from personal liability and thus to destroy a
fundamental attribute of the limited partnership form.
Lawrence Repeta
39. The limited partnership form was originally cast in a mold shaped by the com-
mon law prejudice against limited liability. The courts looked upon even minor
deviations from statutory requirements as causing forfeiture of the privilege of limited
liability. See Crane, Are Limited Partnerships Necessary?, 17 MINN. L. REV. 351, 353-
55 (1933); Lewis, Tize Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 719-
20, 724 (1917); The Limited Partnership Act, supra note 1, at 895-99 (1936). The Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act greatly relaxed the standard of scrutiny; for example, it
provided that substantial compliance in good faith with the requirements for a limited
partnership certificate was sufficient to bring the limited partnership into existence and
thus protect its limited partners from personal liability. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 2(2) (act withdrawn 1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.020(2) (1976). However, the
earlier statutory restrictions on limited partner "interference" were reenacted as a re-
striction on limited partners taking part in control. A drafter of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act pointed out that an investor in a limited partnership was in a position
superior to that of a corporate shareholder because the limited partner's investment was
being managed by people with general liability for the debts of the enterprise, thus in-
suring their best effort. Lewis, supra at 717. The business public gained the same assur-
ance that limited partnerships were well managed. Should a partnership fail, persons in
control would bi held liable because they would be responsible for the impairment of
the creditors' security. Comment, Partnership: Can Rights Required to be Given Lim-
ited Partners under New Tax Shelter Investment Regulations Be Reconciled with Sec-
tion 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act?, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 289, 293 (1973).
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